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L INTRODUCTION 
This case is simply and solely about what due process procedures are due to an 
owner/lessor of an Idaho state liquor license so that it may protect its interest from expiring by 
operation of law. Contrary to the characterizations of this appeal presented by Respondent Idaho 
Alcohol Beverage Control ("'ABC'" or the .. Agency''), appellant BY Beverage Company. LLC 
("'BY Beverage") does not claim that Idaho Code Section 23-908 is unconstitutional, nor does it 
ask that the ABC be required to take actions that are expressly forbidden by Idaho Code Section 
23-908. 
Rather. BY Beverage simply submits to this Court that because the Idaho legislature has 
created a marketplace for the transfer of an interest in a liquor license by lease, and because the 
ABC requires the lessor/owner to pay a substantial fee for its interest in a liquor license and 
undergo the same background checks required of the licensee/lessee, the ABC is also required to 
put into place minimum due process procedures that allow an owner/lessor to protect its property 
right from expiring by operation of !avv. 
Because it is undisputed that minimum due process protections are not available to 
owner/lessors. their property interests are subject to unconstitutional taking through expiration by 
operation of law. BY Beverage respectfully requests that this Court find that the failure to enact 
constitutionally adequate due process protections is an administrative act subject to judicial 
review and, further, to find that the lack of procedures subjected BY Beverage to an 
unconstitutional taking vvithout due process of law. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE AGENCY'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION MISSTATES A NUMBER OF FACTS AND ARGUMENTS 
MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the Agency takes too much liberty with a number of facts that 
appear in the record and misconstrues and/or mischaracterizes a number of arguments presented 
by BV Beverage. By these factual misrepresentations and mischaracterization of the arguments 
presented. the Agency has submitted a brief that does not fairly meet the substance of the 
opening Appellate Brief filed by BV Beverage. Accordingly, BV Beverage respectfully requests 
this Court's indulgence to address these matters one by one so that any confusion arising from 
them may be resolved. 
l. "Unbeknownst to ABC, on September 29, 2010, BV Received by fax from 
Iggy's a Release of Interest and Right of Renewal document, releasing Iggy's 
interest in the licensee back to BV." Resp. Br. at 1. 
The document BV Beverage received from Iggy's was not a "Release of Interest and 
Right of Renewal." Rather. it was an ·'Affidavit-Release of Interest.'' R. p. 57. The Agency 
represents on its website that the ''Affidavit-Release of Interest" is the form to be used when 
the original license is not available. Available at: http://www.isp.idaho.gov/abc/. Cf R. p. 117 
(letter from Cheryl Meade stating "These licenses themselves have an expiration date stamped 
in big letters on the front of them."). The .. Affidavit-Release of Interest" does not state whether 
license is current, nor does it purport to transfer the right to renew a license. See, e.g R. p. 304. 
And, indeed. under the ABC's procedure. '"it is incumbent upon a licensee to continue its 
renewal until the time of transfer.., R. p. 117. 
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2. "In essence, BV sought and continues to seek to be placed in the same shoes 
as a licensee." Resp. Br. at 2. 
BY Beverage does not. and never has. asked that it be placed in the same shoes as a 
licensee. BY Beverage asse11s that. by creating a marketplace for the transfer of a liquor license 
by lease. the Idaho legislature created divisible prope11y rights in an Idaho state liquor license 
and that as the owner/lessor it should be allmved notice and opportunity to protect its interest in 
such liquor license in its own right. See. e.g. R. p. l 83 ("[T]he Agency cannot treat lessors as 
complete strangers to the license and require the lessor to complete a transfer from the lessee 
back to the lessor as a precondition to allmving the lessor the right to renew. Without proper 
notice and opportunity to renew given to the lessor in its capacity as lessor, adverse actions taken 
against the lessee (even if they occur by operation of law) cannot impact the lessor's property 
rights."). See. also. R. p. i 69-178. 
Agreeing with BV Beverage·s arguments. the District Court concluded that lessors have a 
protectable property right in their owner/lessor's interest in a liquor license. R. p. 342. ("Here. 
just as the examples cited to in Roth. the rights appurtenant to the possession of a liquor license 
are statutorily created. Among the rights created by the statute is the right to transfer a liquor 
license by lease. See I.C. § 23-908. Furthermore. liquor license owners have the right to renew 
their licenses. Id. The Idaho Code, therefore. creates in the owner of the liquor license an 
economic benefit that may not be revoked arbitrarily. Given the statutory scheme governing 
liquor licenses, the Court finds that the owner of a liquor license has a property interest in the 
license. and is therefore entitled to notice and the oppo11unity to be heard."). Because 
owner/lessors are entitled to due process protections in their own right. BV Beverage is not 
asking to "step into the shoes'' of a licensee. Instead it is asking to be afforded minimum due 
process protections in its own right. 
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3. "The only person lawfully allowed to exercise the privilege of holding an 
alcohol beverage license is the licensee. The privilege to renew a license is 
also held exclusively by the licensee according to law." Resp. Br. at 2 (citing 
to Idaho Code§§ 23-908(1), 23-907 and 23-1010, and R. p. 246). 
These two statements encompass the very questions to be resolved on this appeal. 
Placing them in the "factual and procedural" background section of the brief with citations to 
statutory authority as though they are well settled law misrepresents the state of the law in Idaho 
and misconstrues the issues to be decided on appeal. 
4. "ABC is not authorized by law to notify third-party lessors of renewal 
dates." Resp. Br. at 4 (citing IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.11.03). 
This is the ABC s interpretation of the statute, not a statement of existing law. Moreover. 
the authority cited is an administrative regulation promulgated by the ABC. The administrative 
regulation cited neither permits nor prohibits the ABC taking any affirmative steps regarding 
providing notice of renewal dates. 
5. "The law does not provide for an exception of additional time for renewal in 
instances where transfers are occurring. Resp. Br. at 4 (citing IDAPA Rule 
11.05.01.12. 
While a technically correct statement of the law, this statement mischaracterizes the issue 
on appeal as BV Beverage has not asked that additional renewal time be given when transfers are 
occurrmg. Rather, BV Beverage argues that as an owner/lessor, it should have had the 
opportunity to renew without first undergoing a cumbersome transfer process. App. Br. at 3. 
For example of cumbersome transfer process required to renew license, see, e.g., R. p. 299-309; 
compare R. p. 45-46 (regarding the BY/Iggy's Transfer) with R. p. 54-56 (regarding the 
attempted BV /Screamin' Hot transfer). 
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6. "(Idaho Code § 23-908! does not provide ABC with the authority to approve 
any lease agreements between a lessor and lessee. R. p. 247. Nor does ABC 
engage in such approval. Id." Resp. Br. at 5. 
The undisputed record evidence shows that the ABC does undertake review of a lease 
agreement between a lessor and lessee and extracts a substantial fee regarding an owner·s 
interest in a liquor license. When a liquor license is transferred pursuant to a lease, the ABC 
mandates that both the lessor/owner and the lessee/licensee submit full and complete transfer 
applications. See R. p. 301-303 (Liquor License Application for Transfer by Sale from Donna 
Ritz to BV Beverage Company, LLC) and R. p. 45-46 (Liquor License Application for Transfer 
by Lease from BV Beverage Company. to Iggy's Idaho Falls, Inc.). The required forms 
mandate that the liquor license lease agreement be submitted with the application. R. p. 46 
(approximately half-way down the page provides ''Liquor License: Leased (Attached a copy 
of the valid lease) Owned- Purchase Price .") 
--
7. "On .January 7, 2011, BV attempted to renew and transfer (the expired 
license) back to itself from Iggy's and then to a national restaurant chain 
called Screamin' Hot Concepts, LLC. R. p. 295, and R. pp. 53-57." Resp. 
Br. at 6. 
BV Beverage did not attempt to renew the license at the time it attempted to transfer from 
Iggy's back to itself and then to Screamin' Hot Concepts. This is because BV Beverage had no 
actual knowledge that Iggy's had not renewed the license until the transfer application was 
rejected. R. p. 59. At that time, BV Beverage questioned the ABC regarding why it did not 
receive notice that the license had not been renewed and/or opportunity to renew the same. R. p. 
91-92. The ABC took the position that because BV Beverage had no interest in the license. it 
was not entitled to renew the license. R. p. 121 c·the right to renew is included among the 
privileges appurtenant to a liquor license and is a privilege which is to be exercised exclusively 
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by the named licensee. l 03 Idaho 364 ( 1982). In the immediate case, the named licensee was 
Iggy's. Therefore, ABC's attempt to notify the licensee of the renewal requirement was properly 
made."). 
8. "BV's argument that ABC's licensing of alcoholic beverages is merely 
ministerial misses the mark." Resp. Br. at 14 (citing App. Br. at 13, section 
2(b). 
BY Beverage has never argued that licensing of alcoholic beverages is merely 
ministerial. To the contrary. BY Beverage has consistently noted that licensing is a police power 
but renewals, which occur as a matter of course, are not. R. at p. 324 ('"When conducting 
background checks and other investigations associated with the processing of a transfer 
application the Agency is appropriately exercising its police power. However, when processing 
a renewal application, the Agency is simply completing a ministerial act or duty.''); see also App. 
Br. at 13 (""Because renewal of a liquor license is a ministerial duty .... ''); and R. p. I 78 ("The 
State does not exercise its police powers with respect to the renewal of a liquor license.") 
(emphasis added). 
9. "[Idaho Code §§ 23-905 and 9071 provide[), among other things and in 
relevant part, that an applicant wishing to become a licensee must submit to 
an investigation. This investigation includes a background check and 
fingerprinting. The third-partv lessor is not subject to these same statutorv 
requirements." Resp. Br. at 15 (emphasis added). 
The statement that a third-party lessor is not subject to a background check and 
fingerprinting is false and directly contradicted by the record. R. p. 299 (Cover letter from BY 
Beverage to the ABC regarding owner/lessor interest in the license: "The $102.00 check is 
remitted as payment of fees associated \vith the processing of fingerprints for Cortney Liddiard, 
Allen Ba!L and Connie Ball'') and R. p. 301 (Reply letter from ABC to BY Beverage: "'Check 
#2009 in the amount of $102.00 was received for the fingerprints for Cortney Liddiard, Allen 
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Ball. and Connie Ball. Allen Ball was already on file for another license, so the $34.00 for his 
fingerprints was applied to the renewal fees .... "). Indeed, BV Beverage has consistently 
maintained that the investigation of owner/lessor applicants renders the rationale supporting 
Uptick unpersuasive. R. p. 166-169. However, the ABC refuses to meet the substance of this 
legal argument. as it continues to incorrectly represent that it does not conduct background 
checks and investigations on lessor/owners. Resp. Br. at 15 (''The third party lessor is not 
subject to these same statutory requirements"). If the ABC does not conduct background checks 
of lessor/owners, then Jamie Adams' letter dated November L 2007. which represented that the 
ABC retained money from BV Beverage for the express purpose of processing fingerprint cards 
of Cortney Liddiard and Connie BalL constitutes a fraud. R. p. 301. 
10. "Had BV filed this [Affidavit-Release of License] with ABC prior to this 
statutory deadline, ABC would have recognized BV as the licensee and 
renewal could have been made timely." Resp. Br. at 22 (citing R. p. 57). 
This statement is not supported by any record evidence and ignores BV Beverage's 
position that it should have been allowed to renew without first having to re-transfer the license. 
As discussed at paragraph l, above, the form "Affidavit-Release of License" is a different fonn 
and serves a function different than that of a ''Release of Liquor License and Transfer of Right of 
Renewal.'' The former is used when the original license is not available and contains no 
information or representations regarding renewal rights. Accordingly, there is no record 
evidence regarding how BV Beverage could have renewed its owner/lessor's interest in the 
liquor license without first submitting a full application to "re-transfer" the license back to itself 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE OWNER OF A LIQUOR 
LICENSE TRANSFERRED BY LEASE HAS A PROTECTABLE PROPERTY RIGHT IN RENEWING 
SUCH LIQliOR LICENSE. 
In its continued claims that owner/lessors have no property rights in the liquor licenses 
for which they paid good and valuable consideration (both to the seller and to the state), the ABC 
ask this Court to reverse the District Court's decision that [Jptick is not controlling under the 
facts of this case. However. because the District Court correctly recognized critical factors 
distinguishing this case from Uptick and, thereafter, undertook an appropriate analysis of 
property rights associated with a liquor license pursuant to current constitutional jurisprudence, 
the District Court was correct in that determination and it should be affirmed. 
1. The facts of this case are materially distinguishable from Uptick and it is, 
therefore, not controlling in this matter. 
The Agency's reliance on Uptick makes sense only if Uptick is unmoored from its factual 
and historical context. Specifically, that portion of Uptick which designates the right to renew as 
a privilege that must be restricted to the named licensee simply does not make sense in light of 
legislative and administrative changes that have occurred with respect to the statute: 
The right to renew is included among the privileges appurtenant 
to a liquor license and is a privilege which is to be exercised 
exclusively by the named licensee. To hold otherwise would 
enable persons who have not subjected themselves to the 
scrutiny and approval of the director of the Department of 
Law Enforcement to acquire an interest in a license and 
circumvent the policv of the act that only qualified persons 
own licenses and exercise rights thereunder. 
Uptick at 369, 647 P.2d at 1241 (emphasis added). While this rationale may have held in the 
factual and historical context within which Uptick was decided, at the time Uptick was working 
its way through the judicial system, the Idaho State Legislature amended Idaho's liquor by the 
drink act and added Section 23-908( 6 ), which specifically allowed for transfers of liquor license 
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by lease. In putting this amendment into place, the Agency requires lessor/owners to submit to 
the exact same background checks to which the licensee is subject. Accordingly, when one 
reviews closely the rationale behind this language it is clear (as the District Court recognized, R. 
p. 342-43) that Uptick does not control in this case because now the ABC does subject 
owner/lessors to its scrutiny, and it extracts a fee from them for doing so. See section A. 6. 
above and R. p. 45-46. BV Beverage holds its owner/lessor's interest in the state liquor license 
pursuant to this state sanctioned process and has undergone the Agency's review and approval. 
Accordingly, there is no legitimate basis to apply the Uptick rationale to disavow BV Beverage's 
prope11y rights. 
2. The Supreme Court of the United States' rejected the wooden distinction 
between privileges and property rights, thereby recognizing that property 
rights can attach to liquor licenses. 
Not only has the factual rational underlying the Uptick decision been undone by 
legislative amendment and subsequent administrative enforcement of such amendments, changes 
in constitutional jurisprudence also counsel against holding onto the rigid "liquor licenses as 
privileges" conclusion reached by the Uptick court. For many years, courts across the country 
held that the use of a state liquor license was a .. privilege'' to which no property rights could 
attach. S'ee. e.g, Uptick Corp. v. Ahlin. 103 Idaho 364, 369-70. 647 P.2d 1236, 1241-42 (1982) 
(citing authority from Arizona, Delaware. Mississippi, Montana, and Wyoming). However, by 
the time C/Jtick was decided, the Supreme Court of the United States had '"fully and finally 
rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and ·privileges' that once seemed to govern the 
applicability of procedural due process rights.'' Bd. of"Regents o/State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564. 571 (1972). Accordingly. rather than relying on the wooden distinction between ''rights" 
and .. privileges" upon which the ABC insists. constitutional jurisprudence requires that courts 
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undertake a more studied analysis of the relationship at issue between the state and the party 
alleging a property right in a liquor licenses. 
Relying on Roth in another context, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that property rights 
and their dimensions are ··are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that 
support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation. 
Dist., 149 Idaho 187. 198, 233 P.3d 118. 129 (2010) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). Moreover, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has declared that Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593 ( 1972), provide the appropriate framework to determine whether property rights can 
arise from a state liquor license. Ciry of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 515 (1973). Since this 
decision. courts in several of our sister states have begun to re-evaluate the rights/privilege 
distinction as it applies to a liquor license. See. e.g. l'v/anos v. City olGreen Bay, 372 F. Supp. 
40. 48-49 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (recognizing that the holder of a liquor license had a protectable 
property interest in the right to renew a liquor license). 
For instance, relying on the guidance of Bruno and the framework set forth in Perry and 
Roth. the Michigan Supreme Court, reversed its longstanding position that a liquor license was a 
·•privilege" granted by the state that could not carry any property rights. See, generally, Bundo v. 
City of' Walled Lake, 395 Mich. 679, 238 N.W.2d 154 (1976). Specifically, the Michigan 
Supreme Court considered the right of renewal (the property rights at issue in this appeal) and 
asked "whether the renewal of an existing liquor license ... involves a private "interest' which is 
either ·liberty' or 'property' within the meaning of the due process clause of the United States 
and Michigan Constitutions." Id at 688, 238 N.W.2d at 158. Rejecting its prior holdings that a 
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liquor license was a "privilege" to which no property rights could attach, the Michigan Supreme 
Court made the following comments: 
[D]efendant in this case has misplaced its reliance on those 
Michigan cases which have held that a liquor license is not a 
·property righf because it is a 'privilege granted by the state'. 
Whatever viability the ·rights/privilege' doctrine had in Michigan 
jurisprudence in the past- under the holdings of the United States 
Supreme Court the mere fact that an interest exists by the grace of 
the government no longer precludes that interest from being treated 
as a "property' right. Those Michigan cases which have relied 
upon this doctrine in finding no property interests in liquor licenses 
no longer can be followed for this purpose. 
Id., at 691-92, 238 N.W. 2d at 160. 
The court then went on to consider that (i) license holders, having already been issued a 
license, have a reasonable expectation that a liquor license would be renewed; (ii) license holders 
invest substantial time and money in liquor licenses based on the reasonable expectation of 
renewal; and (iii) license holders could not get a new license quickly and easily if the license 
were lost. Id .. at 693-695, 238 N. W.2d at 160-61. Based on these factors, the court determined 
that the holder of a liquor license had a property interest in the right to renew and held that the 
right to renew was subject to constitutional due process safeguards. Id. 
3. Where the state creates a marketplace for the transfer, exchange, sale, or 
lease of a license, the property rights associated with a liquor license may be 
held by one other than the named licensee. 
The critical fact distinguishing this case from Uptick is that transfer of a liquor license by 
lease is now authorized by the state through a legislative amendment. Where the issue has been 
squarely presented, our sister courts consistently recognize that a state created marketplace for 
the transfer. exchange. sale, or lease of a license. gives rise to property rights to anyone holding 
an interest in a license pursuant to the state sanctioned transaction, which property rights are 
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entitled to constitutional protections. See, e.g., State v. Saugen, 283 Minn. 402, 405, 169 N. W. 
2d 37, 40 (1969) (noting that while a liquor license may be a privilege granted by the 
government the ability to assign or transfer the license is a property right entitled to due 
compensation in eminent domain proceedings). 
In Saugen, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the value of a liquor license as it 
related to the ·'going concern value'' of a business for purposes of eminent domain. The state 
argued that, because a liquor license was a privilege, no property rights could attach and, 
therefore, no compensation \vas due. Id. at 405, 169 N.W.2d at 40. While observing that the 
several states differed as to whether a liquor license is properly characterized as property or a 
privilege, vis-l't-vis third parties, the court noted: 
This difference of opinion as to the legal nature of a liquor license 
is apparently due to the fact not always recognized by the courts, 
that such license, while a mere privilege as far as the relation 
between the government and the licensee is concerned, 
nevertheless constitutes a definite economic asset of monetary 
value for its owner. 
Id., at 405-06, 169 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Annotation, 148 A.LR. 492.). A state sanctioned 
marketplace for the transfer and exchange of a license gives rise to a constitutional duty to 
provide adequate protections for the property right thereby created: 
It is submitted that \vherever the legislature has made licenses 
assignable or transferable, and the transfer can be effected with the 
consent of the authorities to anyone qualifying under the statute, 
the property element of the license is sufficiently recognized to 
warrant its exposure to seizure by the creditors of the licensee. 
Id., at 406. 169 N.W.2d at 40; see also Boonstra v. City of'Chicago, 214 Ill. App.3d 379, 386-87. 
574 N.E.2d 689, 694 (1991). 
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Accordingly, unless the state is acting within its '·police power" for purposes of 
determining if an applicant is fit to exercise the privileges associated with the license, (i.e .. use 
the license to operate a liquor by the drink establishment), the license must be treated as a 
property interest for all other purposes: "While it is true that liquor businesses are appropriately 
subject to more scrutiny and control than most businesses when the government is acting 
pursuant to its police power, they have the same rights as anv other business when the 
government is not actina. pursuant to such police power. ... " Saugen., at 409, 169 N.W.2d at 42. 
(emphasis added). 
The dual cases of Barr v. Pontiac City Comm ·n. 90 Mich. App. 446, 282 N.W.2d 348 
(Mich. App. 1979) and Bunn v. /vfichigan Liquor Control Comm ·n, 125 Mich. App. 84, 335 
N. W.2d 913 (Mich. App. 1983) specifically considered the property rights of persons other than 
the named licensee who hold an interest in a liquor license. In Barr the license owner sold his 
interest in land, a building, and the liquor license to Epps, but retained for himself a security 
interest in the license. 90 Mich. App. at 448-49, 282 N. W.2d at 349-50. When Barr applied to 
have the license transferred back to himself, the licensing authority disapproved the transfer and 
refused to grant Barr a due process hearing regarding its decision. Id. at 449, 282 N.W.2d at 449. 
The licensing authority maintained that Barr - holder of a "reversionary interest" in the license -
was not entitled to a ··due process hearing because he had no property right in the license 
renewal" and '·at best [Barr] had a mere unilateral expectation as an applicant for a license." Id 
at 45 L 282 N.W. 2d at 350. 
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with the licensing authority's 
decision, finding that the holder of a reversionary interest in a license has a greater property right 
then a new applicant: ''While [Barr's] interest in the license is not 'title· per se. it is a much 
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stronger interest than that of a new applicant or proposed transferee." Id. at 453, 282 N.W.2d at 
351; accord Fuchs v. State, 272 P.3d 1257, 1262 (2012) (holding that a place on the liquor 
license priority list is not a protectable property right). The court then held that Barr's 
reversionary interest in the liquor license gave him a property interest in the renewal of the 
license and he was entitled to minimum due process protections. Barr, at 453, 282 N.W.2d at 
351. Similarly, BV Beverage's interest as an owner/lessor is greater than that of the priority 
waiting list applicant in Fuchs and, like the holder of the reversionary interest in Barr, BV 
Beverage is entitled to due process protections. 
Relying on Barr· s recognition of property rights in one holding a security interest in a 
liquor license. the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the state cannot take adverse actions 
respecting the named licensee that would work to undermine the property rights of another 
holding an interest in that liquor license without proper due process safeguards. Bunn, 125 Mich. 
App. at 88, 335 N.W. 2d at 915. 
In Bunn, Bunn sold his liquor license to Lawson and reserved the right to have the license 
transferred back to him in the event of default. Id .. at 87, 335 N.W.2d at 914. Lawson defaulted 
and Bunn attempted to foreclose on Lawson's property, including the liquor license, and to have 
the license transferred back into his name. Id., at 87-88, 335 N.W.2d at 915. While the court 
held that Bunn did not have a sufficient interest in the license to entitle him to due process notice 
of the adverse actions against Lawson, 1 Id., at 92, 335 N.W.2d at 917, it went on to hold that the 
adverse actions against Lawson could not impact Bunn' s interest in the liquor license: 
1 The concurring opinion disagreed with the court's conclusion that Bunn did not have sufficient interest in the 
liquor license to give him the right to notice of the adverse proceedings pending against Lawson, stating: "I would 
hold that [Bunn] did have a property right in the license in question sufficiently great so as to entitle him to notice of 
the hearing before the city council as well as the MLCC revocation proceeding involving Lawson's liquor license. 
The giving of such notice would not present any undue burden, in that the MLCC is aware of the identity of persons 
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However, once [Bunn) foreclosed upon the property, he held a 
reasonable and legitimate claim of entitlement to the liquor 
licenses. The trial court in the foreclosure action provided in its 
judgment and order that plaintiff regain all of his liquor licenses 
from Lawson. We are of the opinion that Lawson's loss of the 
licenses should not affect plaintiffs legitimate claims to them. 
Id The court specifically noted that the State· s approval of the contractual arrangement between 
Bunn and Lawson gave Bunn the legitimate expectation of retransfrr of the license to him. 
should any problems arise with Lawson: 
[B]ecause [Bunn's] sale of the business. including the underlying 
contractual arrangements, was approved by the MLCC, his 
expectation of retransfer. should any problems arise, was 
legitimate. As the Court noted in Perry v. Sindermann, supra, [a] 
person's interest in a benefit is a property interest for due process 
purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings 
that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit that he may 
invoke at a hearing.'' 408 U.S. 601. 
Based on [Bunn' s] legitimate understanding that security 
arrangements were legitimate and recognized by the MLCC. 
[Bunn] is entitled to rudimentary due process as provided by the 
Court in Barr v. Pontiac City Comm, supra. 449. 
Id. at 93. 335 N.W. 2d at 917. Likewise, in this case the Agency extracted a fee (in the amount 
of $15,000.00) from BV Beverage and, with full knowledge of the contractual arrangement 
between BV Beverage as the owner/lessor and Iggy's as the licensee/lessee of the liquor license 
possessed, reviewed, and approved the transaction. BV Beverage therefore has a legitimate 
expectation of rudimentary due process rights. 
having such interest in licensed establishments." Bunn, 125 Mich. App. at 95-96, 335 N.W.2d at 918 (E.A. 
Quinnel I, J. concurring). 
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4. The legitimate expectation of the right to renew and the existence of a 
marketplace for the transfer of a liquor license by lease, give rise to a lessor's 
protectable property interest in the right to renew. 
The State has created a marketplace for liquor licenses and it has a concurrent 
responsibility to extend due process protections to the property rights arising from such 
marketplace. Where the licensing authority creates a marketplace for licenses, the licenses 
become more than 
just [a] mere personal permit []granted by a governmental body to 
a person to pursue some occupation or carry on some business 
subject to regulation under the police po\ver. Black's Law 
Dictionary 829 (5th ed. 1979). In a functional sense, the[] licenses 
embrace[] the essence of property in that they [are] securely and 
durably owned and marketable. 
Boonstra v. City o/Chicago, 214 Ill. App.Jd 379. 386-87. 574 N.E.2d 689. 694 (1991). That is 
to say the privilege of use of a license regulated pursuant to the state· s police powers may carry 
hallmarks of ownership and marketability that are subject to due process protections. Idaho state 
liquor licenses carry all of the characteristics of marketability and, because these characteristics 
are products of the state's licensing scheme. the state has the responsibility to ensure adequate 
procedural safeguards. 
Idaho's Retail Sale of Liquor-by-the-Drink Act (the Act), J.C. §§ 23-901 et seq., and the 
Rules Governing Alcohol Beverage Commission (the Rules), IDAPA I J.05.01 et seq .. create a 
legitimate expectation of renewal, create a marketplace for the sale and exchange of liquor 
licenses. and support BV Beverage· s claimed property interest in the liquor license. 
In Idaho, the State has created a legitimate expectation of renewal of all issued and 
outstanding liquor licenses because such licenses are renewed as a matter of course. LC. § 23-
908(1 ). Even if the Director has initiated revocation proceedings against the licensees, he must 
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still renew the license during the course of those proceedings. I.C. § 23-933( 4 ). Like renewals, 
transfers are also approved as a matter of course, unless the transfer applicant does not qualify 
under the provisions of the Act. Licenses may be transterred by sale, in bankruptcy, through 
testate or intestate succession, and by lease. LC. § 23-908(5)-(6).2 Because the state allows for 
only a limited number of licenses. I.C. § 23-903. they are a valuable asset to every person who 
holds an interest in one. The State. by creating a legitimate expectation of renewal and 
sanctioning transfers. has created a very active marketplace for liquor licenses. The rational of 
Barr. Boonstra, Bruno, Bundo, Bunn, Perry, Roth and S'uugen can and should guide this Court's 
reasoned review of that portion of Uptick upon which the Agency relies to support its position 
and hold that in the face of (i) materially distinguishable facts and (ii) more developed 
constitutional jurisprudence. the Agency can no longer rely on Uptick to deprive lessor/owners of 
their property interest in liquor licenses. 
5. The Agency's refusal to allow a lessor to renew a liquor license does not bear 
a substantial relation to the exercise of its police power and infringes on the 
lessor's fundamental property rights. 
As between the licensee and the State in the exercise of its police power. a liquor license 
is a privilege. see, e.g. Alcohol Bev. Control v. Boyd, 148 Idaho 944. 947. 231 P.3d I 041. I 044 
(2010). but even the Court in Uptick noted and recognized that a liquor license was a valuable. 
marketable asset. l 03 Idaho 364, 365 n.1. 64 7 P .2d 1236. 123 7 n.1 (1982). Accordingly, a 
2 Idaho Code Section 23-908(6) was added by the legislature at the time Uptick Corp. was making its way through 
the courts. The Legislature specifically noted that the State was missing out on a lot of .. revenue generation" because 
license holders were leasing their liquor licenses and avoiding the I 0% fee for selling liquor licenses. The state 
expressly acknowledged the value created by limiting the number of liquor licenses and creating an active leasing 
marketplace. It then sanctioned transfers by lease and added the 50% fee for the stated purpose of increasing state 
revenue. H.B. 98, Idaho Sess. Laws. Ch. 74. p. I 08 (198 l ); Statement of Purpose & Fiscal Impact, RS 629 l ( 198 l ); 
State Affairs Committee Minutes, Jan. 27, 1981. Feb. 17, 1981. and Mar. JO, l98l. Attached as Appendix A for the 
Court's convenience. 
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distinction must be recognized: when the state is not acting pursuant to its police power. the 
holders of liquor licenses owners of state issued licenses have the same property rights as any 
other property owner. State v. Saugen, 283 Minn. 402. 409, 169 N.W.2d 37. 42 (1969). 
Where the state's purported exercise of its --police powers" do not have ''some direct, real 
and substantial relation to the public object sought to be accomplished" then .. it is incumbent 
upon the judicial department to examine the [regulation] and determine \vhether or not the 
legislatures have overreached their prerogative and impinged the fundamental law." Rowe v. 
City ol Pocatello. 70 Idaho 343, 350. 218 P.2d 695, 699 (1950). ·'[I]f an individual has 
important interests vvhich otherwise would be entitled to the protection of procedural due 
process, he cannot be denied this constitutional safeguard because the business in which he is 
engaged happens to involve alcoholic beverages." Bunda v. City (?f Walled Lake, 395 Mich. 679. 
687. 238 N.W.2d 154, 157 (1976). 
The State does not exercise its police powers with respect to the renewal of a liquor 
license. Once a person has been approved to own a liquor license. the Agency is required to 
approve the renewal application if it is timely and accompanied by the proper fee. I.C. § 23-908. 
Even if revocation proceedings are underway. the Agency must still approve renewal 
applications. LC. § 23-933(4). Because BV Beverage has subjected itself to the Agency's 
application, review and approval process. the evils to be guarded against in Uptick do not exist. 
Contrary to the Agency's representations, lessor/owners do submit to the ABC's review 
and approval process and BV Beverage did so with respect to the at-issue license. The Agency 
declared that BV Beverage was fit to own a liquor license and approved issuance of the license 
to BV Beverage and. contemporaneous with such approvaL approved the transfer of that license 
by lease to a third party. R. p. 000023-46. Because the State has exercised its police power in 
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determining that BV Beverage is fit to own an interest in an Idaho State liquor license, the State 
can gain nothing more in the exercise of its police powers by denying BV Beverage the right to 
renevv and otherwise protect the previously approved interest. Accordingly, the Agency's refusal 
to recognize BV Beverage's property rights in the license and refusal to allow BV Beverage to 
renew the license does not bear a '"direct real, and substantial relation to the public object sought 
to be accomplished.'' It is therefore unreasonable and should not be condoned. 
C. THE DISTRICT COlRT IMPROPERLY FOliND THAT BV BEVERAGE WAS REQUIRED TO 
TRY TO WORK AROl:ND AN ll1'1CONSTITlTIONAL SYSTEM PRIOR TO ASSERTING THAT ITS 
DVE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED. 
1. The established state system is unconstitutional because it does not give 
owner/lessors an opportunity to renew. 
The State has created a marketplace for state liquor licenses so it cannot deprive the 
lessor of its property rights in its liquor license without the minimum protections and safeguards 
required by the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution and United States Constitution: 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Under Idaho Code § 23-932, the Director of the Idaho 
State Police has the statutory duty "to prescribe forms to be used in the administration of this 
act." Idaho Code § 23-908( 1) provides that those seeking to renew a license must submit a 
"proper application .. and submit a ··renewal application" and fee on a schedule set by the 
Director. Pursuant to these two sections. the Director must promulgate forms to be used in the 
renewal of liquor licenses. 
In carrying out its statutory duty to make forms available for the renewal of a liquor 
license. the Agency sends renewal notices and applications for renevval to the named licensee 
only. Because the Agency does not recognize any property rights in the lessor of a liquor 
license. the Agency maintains that the lessor has no right to renew the license and does not 
provide renewal applications to lessors of liquor licenses. Likewise, the Agency does not notify 
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the owner of the liquor license if the lessee has failed to timely submit its renewal application. If 
a lessor wishes to renew the liquor license it must go through the same transfer application 
process as a person who holds no interest whatsoever in the license: it must submit a transfer 
application (to recover the license back from the lessee) along with the lessee· s renewal 
application and an Authorization to Transfer and Assignment of Privilege to Renew. IDAP A 
11.05.01.12.03. In effect, the Agency treats the lessor as a complete stranger to the license. 
In this matter, the District Court held that because BV Beverage did not "pick up the 
phone" to inquire as to the renewal status of its license, then BV Beverage's due process rights 
could not have been violated. R. p. 343. This holding misses the critical constitutional inquiry 
to be made: i.e .. whether adequate due process procedures were in place; not whether the pa11y 
deprived of constitutional protections made enough of an effol1 to work around inadequate 
procedures. 
Each of our due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that because '"minimum [procedural] requirements (are] 
a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the 
State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem 
adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official 
actions." (citations omitted). Indeed, anv other conclusion 
would allow the State to destrov at wilJ virtuallv anv state-
created property interest. The Coul1 has considered and rejected 
such an approach: ''While the legislature may elect not to confer a 
property interest, . . . it may not constitutionally authorize the 
deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate 
procedural safeguards.... [TJhe adequacy of statutory 
procedures for deprivation of a statutorilv created property 
interest must be analvzed in constitutional terms." 
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (emphasis added). 
Idaho's own due process jurisprudence recognizes the need for the same type of 
procedural safeguards: 
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Due process of law is not necessarily satisfied by any process 
which the legislature may by lmv provide. but by such process only 
as safeguards and protects the fundamentaL constitutional rights of 
the citizen. Where the state confers a license upon an individual to 
practice a profession, trade or occupation, such license becomes a 
valuable personal right which cannot be denied or abridged in any 
manner except after due notice and a fair and impartial hearing 
befrwe an unbiased tribunal. 
Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 546, 207 P. 724, 727 (l 922). 
The Supreme Court of the United States explained in Logan that where the established 
state system itself deprives the claimant his constitutional rights by operation of law, such 
system is unconstitutional. Logan, 455 U.S. at 432. In Logan, a state agency's failure to take 
action within the statutory timeframes caused a claimant to be deprived of his constitutional 
rights. See, generally, Id. There, an employee had the right to file claim respecting employment 
discrimination, but under established state procedure, a pre-requisite to filing a claim was for the 
fair employment practices commission to initiate an investigation within 120 days of the 
incident. Id.. at 424. The commission failed to timely commence the investigation and then 
refused to allow the employee to file a claim. Id., at 426. The trial court held that the 
commission's failure to timely institute the investigation deprived the claimant of the right to 
bring his claim as a matter of law. Id., at 436. The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed 
and found that "it rwas] the state system itself that destroys a complainant's property interest, by 
operation of law" and held the system to be unconstitutional. Id.. at 436-38. Tellingly, the 
Supreme Court of the United States did not require the claimant in Logan to have ·'picked up the 
phone .. to inquire as to the status of the investigation. Rather. the Court expressly noted that the 
system was inadequate and held that taking. Yvhich occurred by operation of law following 
agency inaction. was unconstitutional. 
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The instant case is similar to Logan because both established state systems work to 
deprive an individual of property rights by operation of law as the result of agency inaction. 
Under the Act. all state liquor licenses shall expire by operation of law at 1 :00 o'clock a.m. on 
the first day of the renewal month. I.C. § 23-908( l ). However, in order to renew a license, the 
renewal applicant must first receive a renewal application from the Agency. The Agency does 
not provide renewal application to lessors of liquor licenses. Accordingly, if the lessee fails to 
timely renew. the Agency then deems the lessor's interest expired by operation of law and 
without giving the lessor the opportunity to protect its rights. 
The established state system created by the Agency creates an unconstitutional taking. 
As a matter of constitutional law. because the State has created a marketplace for the lease of 
liquor licenses. liquor license lessors have an interest in their respective liquor licenses that are 
subject to minimum due process protections. The Agency cannot, therefore. require lessors to 
rely exclusively on their lessees to timely renevv. Likewise. the Agency cannot treat lessors as 
complete strangers to the license and require the lessor to complete a transfer from the lessee 
back to the lessor as a precondition to allowing the lessor the right to renew. Without proper 
notice and opportunity to renew given to the lessor in its capacity as lessor, adverse actions taken 
against the lessee (even if they occur by operation of law) cannot impact the lessor's property 
rights. The lessor must be afforded the opportunity to protect its own interest. The District 
Court erred by placing upon BV Beverage the duty to "pick up the phone" to work around the 
constitutionally inadequate system as a precondition to asserting the violation of its due process 
rights. 
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2. BV Beverage Does Not Claim that § 23-908 is unconstitutional; only that the 
ABC has given § 23-908 an unconstitutional interpretation and application. 
Contrary to the ABC's contention. BV Beverage does not claim, and has not claimed at 
any point during this matter. that Idaho Code § 23-908 is unconstitutional. Rather, BV Beverage 
submitted below that Idaho Code § 23-908, by creating a marketplace for the transfer of a liquor 
license by lease, created a valuable. protectable property right in the owner/lessor's interest in a 
liquor license. R. p. 169-180. Through its interpretation of Idaho Code Section 23-908 and its 
refusal to allow owner/lessors the right to renew. the ABC is abridging an owner's valuable 
property rights without due process of law. The District Court agreed with this argument and 
held that such property right does exist and, further. that there were substantial problems with the 
ABC's renewal procedures. R. p. 342-43. 
The ABC correctly notes that where a property right exists, the constitutional 
jurisprudence of both the United States of America and the State of Idaho provides 
there must be some process to ensure that the individual is not 
arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal 
constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant is 
provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Resp. Br. at 11 (citing A herdeen-Springfield Canal Co .. 133 Idaho at 91, 982 P .2d at 926, citing 
State v. Rhoades. 121 Idaho 63, 72. 822 P.2d 960. 969 (1991); and A.E. "Ed" Fridenstine v. 
Idaho Dep"t ofAdministrafion. 133 Idaho 188, 983 P.2d 842 (1999)). The Agency maintains, 
however. that it is not required to allow lessors the opportunity to renew liquor licenses because, 
under the fdaho Supreme Court's holding in Uptick, the right to renew a liquor license is a 
privilege which may only be exercised by the named licensee. Uptick Cmp. v. Ahlin, 103 Idaho 
364, 64 7 P .2d 1236 ( 1982 ). However, as discussed at length above, Up! ick is not controlling and 
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the Agency is under a constitutional duty to create due process procedures that adequately 
protect the property interests of owner/lessors. 
3. Providing owner/lessors with notice and an opportunity to renew is not 
inconsistent with Idaho Code § 23-908. 
The ABC argues that Section 23-908 does not authorize it to allow the owner/lessor of a 
liquor license to renew such license. Resp. Br. at 16-19. However, the actual words of this 
statute do not mandate this conclusion. Moreover, adopting the ABC's interpretation would 
deprive BV Beverage of its interest in the license without due process protections. thereby giving 
rise to an unconstitutional interpretation of the statute. 
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that where a statute is plain, clear and 
unambiguous, this Court is constrained to follow that plain meaning and neither add to the statute 
nor take away by judicial construction. Moon v. S'tate Board of Land Commissioners, 111 Idaho 
389, 392, 724 P.2d 125. 128 (1986). Section 28-903(1) is not ambiguous. If a statute is 
ambiguous and the court is faced with two constructions of a statute, one of which would render 
it unconstitutional and one of which would not, this Court must adopt the construction that would 
uphold the statute. Aloon, 111 Idaho at 392, 724 P.2d at 128. Because the actual words of 
Section 23-908 do not restrict the ABC from providing owner/lessors with the opportunity to 
renew a license and because that interpretation is constitutional it must be adopted. 
In order to find a statutory prohibition against owner/lessors exercising the right to renew 
a license. this Court must read the words "only the licensee" into two sentences within the 
statute. However, where the legislature intended to refer to "only the licensee" it did so 
expressly. Conversely, where the passive voice is used no subject is specified. 
The statute provides three material portions directly addressing renewals: two are 111 
passive voice and one is in active voice. (Passive) ··Al! licenses shall expire at 1 :00 o'clock a.m. 
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on the first day of the renewal month which shall be determined by the director by administrative 
rule and shall be subject to annual renewal upon proper application." I.C. § 23-908(1) (emphasis 
added). (Passive) "[r]enewal applications for liquor by the drink licensee accompanied by the 
required fee must he filed with the director on or before the first day of the designated renewal 
month." I.C. § 23-908(1) (emphasis added). The passive voice used in these two sentences 
indicates that there are no restrictions regarding the proper actor. 
However. when discussing the consequences of not timely filing a renewal application, 
the legislature specifically invokes an active voice, noting that consequences run to only the 
licensee-the only party exercising the privilege of engaging in the retail sale of alcohol: 
Any licensee holding a valid license who fails to file an application 
for renewal of his current license on or before the first day of the 
designated renewal month shall have a grace period of an 
additional thirty-one (31) days in which to file an application for 
renewal of the license. The licensee shall not be permitted to sell 
and dispense liquor by the drink at retail during the thirty-one (31) 
day extended time period unless and until the license is renewed. 
Idaho Code § 23-908( 1) (emphasis added). The legislature specifically stated that if a licensee 
(i.e .. the only party holding an interest in the liquor license who is authorized to engage in retail 
sale of liquor by the drink) fails to timely renew, the licensee can no longer engage in retail sale 
of liquor by the drink. In contrast to the passive sentences that do not identifying a particular 
subject (thereby indicating any person may file a renewal application and fee), this is the only 
sentence that directly addresses the licensee and specifically restricts privileges associated with 
use of a license. These portions of Section 28-903( l) show that the legislature knew how to (and 
did) indicate when the statute was to apply to only a licensee. Accordingly, the restrictive 
renewal procedures put in place by the ABC are not mandated by the statute. 
The ABC's interpretation also requires this Court to read into the statute a historical 
judicial gloss. ABC argues that the language of Idaho Code § 23-908, which provides ... "no 
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person except the licensee therein named except as herein otherwise provide, shall exercise any 
of the privileges granted thereunder .. .'' (Resp. Br. at 16) -combined with dicta from Uptick v. 
Ahlin that provides that the privilege to renew a liquor license was exclusive to the named 
licensee (Resp. Br. at 18-19). means that the privilege of the right to renew is exclusive to the 
named licensee. However, the statute never expressly identified the right to renew as a privilege 
and, explained above, the rationale behind Uptick no longer controls and the statute does not 
mandate the reading suggested by Uptick. Accordingly, Uptick need not preclude this Court 
from giving the statute the constitutional interpretation offered by BV Beverage. 
By removing this historical judicial gloss of Uptick and focusing, instead, on the actual 
words of the statute. this Court can give that statute a reading that protects the property rights of 
an owner lessor and gives the statute a constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, the 
interpretation offered by the ABC must be rejected. 
4. The Agency's failure to enact constitutionally adequate procedures is a 
reviewable agency action. 
In this matter, the District Court improperly held that because the license expired by 
operation of law. the Agency took no reviewable action. R. p. 341. However, the appealable 
error raised by B V Beverage is that the agency failed to enact constitutionally adequate 
procedures which BV Beverage could have used to prevent its owner/lessor·s interest in the 
license from expiring by operation of law. App. Br. at 15-16. The ABC has not addressed this 
point of error. instead reiterating the District Court's holding. Resp. Br. at 23. 
The record in this matter presents undisputed evidence that the ABC failed to put 
procedures in place whereby BV Beverage. as the owner/lessor of a liquor license, could have 
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renewed its interest in the license in its own right (i.e., without first processing a transfer of the 
b k . If) R 16,., ,.,· . R 1'7-1?8 
3 license from Iggy" s ac · to itse . . p. J ( dtmg . p. .... ~ ). Under Idaho law, 
administrative action may be revievved where such action was .. (a) in violation of constitutional 
or statutory provisions'' or .. (c) made upon unlawful procedure.'' In this case, the alleged 
deprivation occurred as the result Agency's failure to enact constitutionally adequate procedures. 
The fact that the Agency's failures precluded BV Beverage from being able to protect its interest 
in the license from expiring by operation of law cannot preclude BV Beverage from redress for 
the harm caused by the agency inaction. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co .. 455 U.S. 422, 432 
( 1982). BV Beverage respectfully requests that this Court hold that unconstitutional inaction is. 
indeed, reviewable and on such grounds reverse that portion of the District Court's decision 
holding that the Agency did not take any action that is reviewable. 
HI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, BV Beverage respectfully submits that the ABC has not 
presented any compelling argument or authority supporting the absence of lawful renewal 
procedures necessary to allow an owner/lessor of a liquor license to protect its valuable property 
rights in the same. Because no such procedure exists, the expiration by operation of law of BV 
Beverage's interest it its license without notice and opportunity to renew the same is 
unconstitutional and cannot be upheld. BV Beverage requests that the District Court's holding 
that this is not a reviewable agency action and the District Courf s holding that BV Beverage's 
1 In a letter rejecting BV Beverage's position that it should have had notice and opponunity to renew the license. 
without first having to transfer it back to itself from the ABC informed BV Beverage as follows: ··ABC is 
not statutorily. nor required by regulation to give a notice of renewal to a licnesee. much less an entity that is not the 
named licensee.·· And. further. that "'It appears that BV Beverage failed. due to its own oversight. to exercise its 
option to repossess and transfer the I icense back to itself.... Had BV Beverage taken this step, BV Beverage would 
have known, long before Iggy's license expired. when the license was due to be renewed.'' R. p. 128. 
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due process rights were not violated be overturned and this matter be remanded to the District 
Court with instructions to enter a judgment reinstating the license to BV Beverage. 
DATED this 23rd day of July. 2012. 
RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Petitioner/ Appellant 
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Cheryl Meade 
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CHAPTER 74 
(H.B. No. 71) 
AN ACT 
c • 74 I 81 
RELATING TO ANNUAL FEES PAID TO THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; 
AMENDING SECTION 61-1001, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PERSONNEL COSTS OF THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, 
OTHER THAN SALARIES AND RELATED PAYROLL EXPENSES OF COMMISSIONERS, 
BE PAID FROM FEES ASSESSED AGAINST UTILITIES, RAILROAD CORPORA-
TIONS AND MOTOR CARRIERS . 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 61-1001, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
61-1001. ANNUAL FEES PAYABLE TO COMMISSION BY PUBLIC UTILITIES 
AND MOTOR CARRIERS -- PURPOSE. Each public utility and each railroad 
corporation, subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, and 
subject to the provisions of this act, shall pay to the commission in 
each year, a special regulatory fee in such amount as the commission 
shall find and determine to be necessary, together with the amount of 
all other fees paid or payable to the commission by each such public 
utility and railroad corporation in the current calendar year, 
together with the fees collected by the commission from motor carriers 
under chapter 8 , title 61, Idaho Code, to defray the amount to be 
expended by the commission for expenses in supervising and regulating 
the public utilities, railroad corporations and motor carriers subject 




eor;-and-elerks-and-seeretaries-assigned-to-administration, except for 
salaries and related payroll expenses for the commissioners. 
Approved March 23, 1981 . 
CHAPTER 75 
(H.B. No. 98) 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO LIQUOR BY THE DRINK LICENSES; AMENDING SECTION 23-908, 
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR A FEE FOR THE TRANSFER OF A LIQUOR BY 
THE DRINK LICENSE. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 23-908, Idaho Code, be , and the same is 
hereby amended to read as fol.lows: 
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23-908. FORM OF LICENSE AUTHORITY -- EXPIRATION -- LIMITA-
TIONS. (1) Every license issued under this act shall set forth the 
me of the person to whom issued, the location by street and number, 
na other definite designation, of the premises, and such other 
~rformation as the director shall deem necessary. If issued to a part-
in f h · · h h · h 11 ership, the names o t e persons const1.tut1ng sue. partners i.p s a 
~e set forth. If issued to a corporation or association, the names of 
the principal officers and the governing board shall be set forth . 
Such license shall be signed by the licensee and prominently displayed 
in the place of business at all times . Every license issued under the 
provisions of this act is separate and distinct and no person except 
the licensee therein named except as herein otherwise provided, shall 
. exercise any of the privileges granted thereunder. All licenses shall 
expire at 1:00 o'clock A.M. on January 1st of the following year and 
shall be subject to renewal upon proper application. Renewal applica-
tions for liquor by the drink licenses accompanied by the required fee 
must be filed with the director on or before January 1st of the 
following year, provided, however, any licensee holding a valid li-
cense who fails to file an application for renewal of his current li-
cense on or before January 1st of the following year shall have a 
·•grace period of an additional thirty-one (31) days in which to file an 
application for renewal of his license and during which time he shall 
: not be permitted to sell and dispense liquor by the drink at retail. 
No person shall be granted more than one (1) license in any city for 
.any one (1) year; and no partnership, association or corporation hold-
ing a license under this act shall have as a member, officer or stock-
holder any person who has any financial interest of any kind in, or is 
a member of, another partnership or association or an officer of 
another corporation holding a license in the same city for the same 
rear; provided that this section shal l not prevent any person, firm or 
corporation, owning two (2) or more buildings on connected property in 
• city from making application for and r e ceiving licenses permitting 
the sale of liquor by the drink in such building. 
(2) An application to transfer any license issued pursuant to 
chapter 9, title 23, Idaho Code, shall be made to the director. Upon 
receipt of such an application, the di rector shall make the same 
i nvestigation and determinations with respect to the transferee as are 
required by section 23-907, Idaho Code, and if the director shall 
!letermine that all of the conditions required of a licensee under 
chapter 9, title 23, Idaho Code, have been met by the proposed trans-
fe ree, then the license shall be indorsed over to the proposed trans-
f~ree by said licensee for the remainder of the period for which such 
icense has been issued and the di rector shall note his approval 
thereof upon such license. 
· (3) Each new license issued on or after July 1, 1980, shall be 
laced into actual use by the original licensee at the time of issu-
;nce and remain in use for at least six (6) consecutive months or be 
Orfeited to the state and be eligible for issue to another person by 
~ director after compliance with the provisions of section 23-907, 
tw ho Code. Such license shall not be transferrable for a period of 
'frro (2) years from the date of original issuance, except as provided 
subsections i!!l(a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of-stteseetioa-(47 of this 
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section . 
(4) The fee for transferring a liquor license shall be ten per 
cent (10%) of the purchase price of the liquor license or the cost of 
good will , whichever i s greater; except no fee shall be collected in 
the following events: 
(a) The transfer of a license between husband and wife in the 
event of a property division; or 
(b) The transfer of a license to a receiver, trus t ee in bank-
ruptcy or similar person or officer; or 
(c) The transfer of a license to the heirs or personal repre-
sentative of the estate in the event of the death of the licensee; 
or 
(d) The transfer of a license arising out of the di ssolution of a 
partnership where the license is transferred to one or more of the 
partners.,.~ 
(e) The trans fer of a license within a family whethe r an indi-
vidual, partnership or corporation. 
(5) The fee for transferring a liquor license for other than a 
sale shall be fifty per cent (50%) of the per annum license fee set 
forth in section 23-904, Idaho Code; except no fee shal l be collected 
for transfers as outl ined in section 23- 908, subsection (4)(a), (b), 
(c), (d), or (e), Idaho Code . 
( 6) The controlling interest i n the stock ownership of a corpo-
rate ""licensee shall not be, directly or indirectly , sold , t ransferred , 
or hypothecated unless the licensee be a corporation, the stock of 
which is listed on a stock exchange in Idaho , or in the city of New 
York, state of New York, or which is required by l aw t o file periodi c 
reports with the securities and exchange commission. Provided , how-
ever, that in the event of the t r ansfer of more than twenty-five per 
cent (25%) of t he authori zed and issued stock of the corporation, it 
shall create a rebuttable presumption that such transfer constitutes a 
transfer of the contro l ling interest of such corporation. 
Approved March 23, 1981 . 
CHAPTER 76 
(H .B. No. 99 ) 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO THE SALE OF KEG BEER; AMENDING CHAPTER 10, TITLE 23, IDAHO 
CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 23- 1018, IDAHO CODE, TO 
REQUIRE THAT THE SELLER OF KEG BEER BE I DENTIFIED ON THE CON-
TAINER . 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Chapter 10, Title 23, Idaho Code, be, and the 
same is hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be 
known and designated as Section 23- 1018, Idaho Code, and to read as 
follows: 
.... · . 
• • •. • . • t • ... ~ ~ . 
,· . ' 
· . . i · 
. , . 
·. •' 
, .._ I • 
:.:; . .. . STATEMENT OF PURPOSE . . ·,, . .., 
RS 6291 .. ~ '• . •.'. 
·. \ .,r . ~ .. :~\~_. ,•:«~ : .:· • ( 
.Idafio iaw. c~rr~ntly ~i~Ccs' ~~~~~r~i·jl~~ticti6;, ~ri'\k~, ~Q~;.~.;s. ·t c .. ·· ~·r··· ;·,~ .. : ...  ·..·•.'. . ~.'.':'.'·.:i_:, .'..;;···.: _ .:_:·!·:·l·· '.·.·:'.':r ..;.·. 
·, ·. : . . · .• ' -~· :~.' . ... : :'\ :· .' ! <./:\~;t:. . ~ '::: .. : ' ~;; _:.' ·~ ..  ·. .. . . ... . .: .. ·. ~:. ' . ! . ·.~. :: )~ ~·>" . ' :-: _;:,. . ( >:·;}' >: . . ~ ... ., .. . ,. ·1: 
· .. . an<:} \ise of retail liquor licenses ' 'onc~ .those licenses are obtained ·.·:; 
, ~ { : .· · ... -i ~ ' ; ... '·£-: ~. . ~ · " ·: ~-l• . :! • . • • . '-'-~-· •• . ";:::: 
from th~ State of Idaho. .. The proposed "iegislation will clarify . ... _ .. · .. ~ · 
the procedure utilized in the. transfer of a liquor license in ::,: ( ::_., ··: 
those cases where the· lic~nse is belng , 1:1tilized .. 
• ,'r · . 'r-' • , I .... •• .' 
It does so by 
...... ·~ . - .. ~·:. .. . . .. . .. 
requiring that a trans.fer othe.r t iw.n: a.·.- 'sale shall be suJ:>jc?t t.o 
a transfer fee of 50% of the annual license fee. 
FISCAL Ii·1PACT 
: . . 
This legislat.ion will generate approximately $26 ,000 .to the 
General Account. 
• •. • « ', 
·, . 
·' STJ\'fgMf'.!NT OP PURPOSE/FISC.l\..L NOTE 
« .. .. _ .... · . 
. . ; ~ ... -,. 
H 
" ~ \ . 
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Minutes of the State Affairs Committee 
Held January 27, 1981 
Page 2 
RS 6307 TRANSPORTING ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN OPEN CONTAINER. Mr. Cade 
explained that this bill changes wording. As it now stands, 
the officer must see a person break the seal of container to 
find him guilty. This changes the wordage in 1947 bill to 
close this loophole. This does not apply to beer. 
MOTION: Representative Paxman made a motion that RS 6307 be introduced, 
the motion was seconded by Rep. Braun. The motion carried. 
RS 6309:, PROHIBITS SALE OR DISPENSING OF WINE AT ANY UNLICENSED 
PREMISES. Mr. Cade explained that this relates to allowing 
consumption of liquor on premisis to require liquor license. 
Mr. Cade asked permission to speak to RS 6309 and RS 6310 
at same time as they are companion bills. Permission was 
granted. This bill would require that any place other than 
a private residence would be included in this law. This would 
require purchase also of city and county licenses in addition 
to state license. 
MOTION: Representative Bunting made a motion to return RS 6309 to the 
sponsor. The motion was seconded by Rep. Lewis. The motion 
carried. 
RS 6310: PROHIBITS SALE OR DISPENSING OF BEER AT ANY UNLICENSED PREMISES. 
Companion bill to RS 6309. 
MOTION: A motion was made by Rep. Bunting and seconded by Rep. Lewis 
to return this bill to the sponsor. The motion carried. 
RS 6291 RELATES TO THE TRANSFER AND USE OF RETAIL LIQUOR LICENSES ONCE 
OBTAINED FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO. Mr. Cade pointed out that 
last year the legislature passed a transfer fee on the sale of 
liquor license at 10% of price. This legislation would require 
that a transfer other than sale shall be subject to a transfer. 
fee of 50% of the annual license fee. Mr. Cade explained the 
license fee rates according to population and the total costs 
involved. 
MOTION: A motion was made by Representative Hammond and seconded by 
Rep. Paxman to introduce RS 6291. The motion carried. 
RS 6375: REPEALS IDAHO PLANNING AND ZONING ACT. Representative Fullmer 
spoke in favor of this bill. He stated that the State Code 
takes right from property owner to use his land as he sees fit. 
He feels there are too many controls over private property 
owners. Mr. Fullmer cited instances of problems he had dealt 
with in LosAngeles relating to zoning ordinances. He expressed 
fear of Idaho experiencing many of these problems. Mr$. Oliason 
also spoke to RS 6375. She mentioned several abuses she felt 
had taken place in Ada county. 
MOTION: A motion to introduce was made by Representative Montgomery; 
the motion was seconded by Rep. Little. Rep. Montgomery stated 
that he thinks RS 6375 will generate discussion on matters of 
great concern to many constitutients. Several other representatives 
expressed this same feeling. Rep. Higgins stated that he would 
oppo~e repeal but does not oppose change. Motion carried. 
There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned 






House State Affairs Committee 
February 17, 1981 
Page 2 
Rep. Little made a motion with Rep. Harris seconding to 
send HB 97 to the floor with a "do oass" recommendation. 
An amended motion was made by Rep. Chatburn and seconded 
by Rep. Little to draft a new bill. The Amended Motion 
Carried. A new bill will be drafted. 
WOULD PROVIDE FOR A FEE FOR THE TRANSFER OF A LIQUOR BY 
THE DRINK LICENSE. Mr. Cade explained that liquor last year 
the legislature passed a transfer fee on the sale of liquor 
licenses at 10% of the license fee imposed by the state. 
HB 98 would require that a transfer other than sale shall 
be subject to a transfer fee of 50% of the annual license 
fee. Mr. Cade explained the license fee rates increase 
according to population. 
Rep. McDermott made a motion to hold HB 98 for further study 
no second was made. Rep. Little made a motion to send 
HB 98 to the floor with a "do oass" recommendation. 
Rep. Chatburn seconded the motion. Rep. McDermott stated that 
she does not feel that a case is made to change the law. 
Rep. Lewis stated that he feels it will give the Dept. of 
Law Enforcement more control and would be in favor of the bill. 
The motion carried. Rep. Danielson will sponsor the bill. 
-=---' 
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM FOR KEG BEER. Mr. Cade stated that this 
is a companion bill to HB 97. The keg beer will be identified 
with a tag which will in turn identify the seller and buyer. 
There would be no cost of tags to seller and the records would 
be kept for one year. 
Representative Bateman made a motion to send HB 99 to the 
floor with a "do pass" recommendation. Rep. Harris seconded 
the motion. Rep. Stoicheff indicated that keg licensing 
should be sufficient to help with problems. Rep. McDermott 
expressed concern of large amounts of paperwork for sellers 
and feels distributors try to assure they're not selling to 
minors. Rep. Bateman stated that HB 99 would be a good tool 
to help with the problem. The Motion carried. Rep. Bateman 
will sponsor the bill on the floor. 
There being no further business, the meeting adjourned. 
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agreements because Indian tribes are not included 
in the statute as a government or state agency. 
N: Senator Twilegar moved and Senator Kiebert seconded 
this be sent out with a "do pass" recommendation. 
Motion carried. 
N: Senator Risch moved and Senator Twilegar seconded 
the reappointment of Eugene Miller to the State Board 
of Education, be sent out 'llith a "do confirm" re-
commendation. Motion carried. 
ANNUAL FEES PAID TO THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSIO~. 
Jim Fell, PUC, explained the legislation which would 
allow administrative personnel costs other than the 
salaries of the commissioners to be paid from fees 
assessed against utilities, railroad corporations 
and motor carriers. 
JN: Senator Twileger moved and Senator Steen seconded 
this be sent out vJith a "do pass" recommendation. 
Motion carried. 
3 LIQUOR BY THE DRINK LICENSES. 
Pat Riceci explained the legislition. He said since 
the passage of this legislation a problem has come 
up regarding the leasing of the license. A license 
is leased out and thus gets around the transfer fee. 
ON: Senator Twilegar moved and Senator Risch seconded 
this be sent out \'lith a "do pass" recommendation. 
Motion carried. 
13 EXPENDITURES FOR COMMUNICATIONS & POSTAGE FOR STATE 
AGENCIES. 
Mr. Luthy, Department of Administration, explained 
the legislation. He said they were experiencing a 
30% increase in costs. This bill would give them 
the authority to pay their bills on time. 
:ON: Senator Risch moved and Senator Twilegar seconded 
this bill go out with a "do pass" recommendation. 
Motion carried. 
7173 DISQUALIFICATIONS FROM JURY DUTY: OVER 70. 
ION: Senator Steen moved and Senator Twilegar seconded this 
be sent for introduction. Motion carried. 
